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FROM KATZ TO GREENWOOD: ABANDONMENT GETS RECYCLED
FROM THE TRASH PILE - CAN OUR GARBAGE BE SAVED FROM
THE COURT'S RUMMAGING HANDS 9
The UnitedStates Supreme Court has upheld the warrant-
less search and seizure of residential trash left for curbside
pickup. The author contends that this decision was based not
on the precedents cited by the Court but on previously discred-
ited property law analyses. The author urges the Court to as-
sess fourth amendment privacy rights on the basis of a defend-
ant's outward manifestations of intent, rather than on self-
validating conclusions regarding "reasonable" expectations of
privacy.
INTRODUCTION
SINCE ARTICULATING NEW standards for assessing the
breadth of fourth amendment protection in Katz v United
States,1 the Supreme Court has beaten a retreat from the princi-
ples it set forth. The test announced in Katz was intended to be an
expansion of an individual's right to be free from governmental
intrusion.2 Nevertheless, fourth amendment analysis under Katz
has not been protective of individual liberties, except in the area
of audio surveillance.3 Over the years, the Court has refused to
extend fourth amendment protection to the use of pen registers4 or
tracking beepers,5 to packages already purposefully or inadver-
1. 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
2. See United States v. Ford, 553 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding that Katz
expanded the fourth amendment beyond the boundaries of actual physical trespass, broad-
ening its scope and maintaining its existing safeguards against unreasonable intrusions
upon physical privacy).
3. Katz specifically overruled a long line of cases allowing nontrespassory audio sur-
veillance. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (overruling Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129
(1942), and Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928)).
4. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (phone company's use of a pen
register to track numbers dialed is not a "search" within the meaning of the fourth
amendment).
5. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (police use of tracking beepers
to follow defendant does not constitute a search or seizure).
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
tently opened by private citizens,6 to aerial surveillance of citizens'
backyards,7 bank records,8 or to conversations over cordless tele-
phones.9 Recently, the Court maintained its very narrow limits on
fourth amendment protection, refusing, in California v Green-
wood,'0 to require a warrant for the search and seizure of residen-
tial trash placed at the curbside for pickup by a designated dispo-
sal agency Greenwood represents the most recent articulation of
the Court's fourth amendment analysis regarding the definition of
a search." This note will propose a new method for resolving
search-and-seizure issues within the factual framework of curbside
trash reconnaissance.
Katz marked the end of the Court's application of an archaic
property law analysis to fourth amendment questions.' 2 In its
place, Katz advocated a more flexible "expectation of privacy"
test. This privacy test broadened the scope of fourth amendment
protection beyond those places or things in which the citizen re-
tained a possessory or property interest.' 3 In the trash reconnais-
sance paradigm, the Katz case represents a departure from a sim-
ple examination of whether the trash was abandoned, in favor of
the more sophisticated analysis of whether the individual mani-
fested a reasonable expectation that the contents of the trash
would remain private.' 4 This note advocates an interpretation of
Katz which grants fourth amendment protection to any individual
who manifests an intent to keep his or her affairs private.
Katz created a new terminology for fourth amendment analy-
6. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984) (fourth amendment does not
require a search warrant to test white powder flowing from a damaged package found on a
private freight carrier).
7. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1987) (police may conduct airborne
search from public airspace without acquiring a warrant).
8. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (fourth amendment does not
require a search warrant for examination of the bank records of a third party).
9. See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 723
(1990).
10. 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
11. A recent case from the lower courts is Tyler v. Berodt, in which the Eighth
Circuit declined to extend fourth amendment protection to conversations on cordless tele-
phones. 877 F.2d at 706-07. However, the Supreme Court denied the petition for certiorari
in that case without an opinion. 110 S. Ct. 723. Hence, Greenwood remains the Court's
most recent statement of its standards for assessing the scope of the fourth amendment.
12. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 352-53.
13. See id. at 353.
14. The phrase "reasonable expectation of privacy" actually derives from Justice
Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz. 389 U.S. at 360. Through time, however, the phrase
has become a shorthand for the approach contained in the majority opinion.
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sis. However, courts have used the Katz terminology without em-
ploying its rationale. This note argues that the Court's present res-
olution of fourth amendment cases, such as Greenwood, is
inconsistent with the analysis urged in Katz.15 Moreover, this note
suggests that what really lies behind the Court's present use of
Katz-inspired fourth amendment terminology is an abandonment
approach to the question of whether particular surveillance activ-
ity can be called a "search."
This note will scrutinize the Court's frequently cited conten-
tion that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in some-
thing voluntarily conveyed to a third party 18 This maxim merely
denies the reasonableness of a privacy expectation in abandoned
objects. This note argues that the purpose of Katz was to establish
that a person might have a reasonable expectation of privacy in an
abandoned object, but the majority failed to express this clearly
enough. Consequently, the Court has interpreted Katz's "reasona-
ble expectation of privacy" terminology to require that the as-
serted expectation be objectively reasonable. Combining this inter-
pretation with the veiled abandonment analysis clarifies the
Court's current analysis: To assert an expectation of privacy in
something voluntarily transferred to a third party is to express
one's expectation of privacy in an abandoned thing - an expecta-
tion entirely unreasonable when measured by accepted societal
15. A number of commentators have attempted to highlight the apparent inconsis-
tencies between the holding in Greenwood and the majority's analysis in Katz. See, e.g.
Note, Fourth Amendment-Further Erosion of the Warrant Requirement for Unreasona-
ble Searches and Seizures: The Warrantless Trash Exception, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 623, 645-46 (1988) [hereinafter Note, Further Erosion] (criticizing the Court's
characterization of trash disposal as "voluntary" but concluding that the occasional "inva-
sion" of trash bags puts garbage outside the realm of fourth amendment protection); Note,
California v. Greenwood: Supreme Court Decides To Keep the Fourth Amendment Out of
the Trash, 67 N.C.L. Rav. 1191 (1989) [hereinafter Note, Supreme Court Decides] (argu-
ing for a showing of probable cause); Note, Was the Right to Privacy Trashed in Califor-
nia v. Greenwood?, 24 TULSA LJ. 401 (1988) [hereinafter Note, Right to Privacy] (argu-
ing for a fact specific approach to trash search cases, restriction of police conduct in
garbage searches, and liability to private individuals and governmental employees for im-
proper seizure and use of data gained in trash searches); Note, California v. Greenwood: A
Trashing of the Fourth Amendment?, 91 W VA. L. REv. 597 (1988) [hereinafter Note,
Trashing] (criticizing the Court's characterization of trash conveyance as "voluntary" and
its reasoning that because trash "bags are sometimes invaded" they should not be given
fourth amendment protection).
16. See, e.g., Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 36-37 (garbage left at curbside); Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979) (phone numbers dialed using equipment installed
by phone company); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976) (checks and deposit
slips given to a bank).
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norms.
Based on the foregoing analysis, this note contends that the
Court, in cases such as Greenwood, propagates an interpretation
of Katz that was wholly unintended by the Katz majority. This
note concludes that a better approach is to recognize the para-
mount importance of the individual's "behavioral manifesta-
tions"' 7 in resolving trash reconnaissance issues.18 Courts should
focus primarily on the defendant's manifestations of intent as they
would be interpreted by a reasonable person, rather than asking
whether an asserted expectation of privacy is itself abstractly
reasonable.
I. HISTORY OF FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
A. The Pre-Katz Approach: Abandonment and Trespass
Property law concepts such as "abandonment," "trespass,"
and "curtilage" dominate the history of fourth amendment juris-
prudence. Employing a strict literal interpretation of the fourth
amendment,' 9 the Court limited the protection of the amendment
to those cases involving some physical intrusion onto the property
or against the person of the defendant. 20 Likewise, police conduct
17. Smith v. State, 510 P.2d 793, 801 (Alaska) (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 1086 (1973).
18. In his dissent, Judge Rabinowitz concluded that he "would focus upon [the] ap-
pellant's behavior in an effort to determine whether or not she intended to knowingly dis-
close to the public the contents of her garbage." Id. at 803 (Rabinowitz, J., dissent-
ing); see infra text accompanying notes 131-43.
19. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV
20. The origin of this restrictive construction of the fourth amendment undoubtedly
lies in Lord Camden's celebrated decision in Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B.
1765), quoted in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1885). Lord Camden, commenting
on the validity of general search warrants, stated:
By the laws of England, every invasion of private property, be it ever so minute,
is a trespass. No man can set his foot upon my ground without my license, but
he is liable to an action though the damage be nothing, which is proved by every
declaration in trespass where the defendant is called upon to answer for bruising
the grass and even treading upon the soil [I]t is now incumbent upon the
defendants to show the law by which this seizure is warranted. If that cannot be
done, it is a trespass.
Boyd, 116 U.S. at 627 (quoting Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials 1066, 95
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that did not transgress the physical boundaries of the defendant's
property was not a "search" for fourth amendment purposes. Two
illustrative cases are Olmstead v United States2' and Goldman v
United States.2 Both cases concerned audio surveillance. In Olm-
stead, police secured evidence of an illegal liquor distribution con-
spiracy by attaching wiretaps to the defendant's telephone lines.23
Since the telephone wires were tampered with at a point away
from the defendant's property, the Court found the warrantless
surveillance valid.24 More specifically, the Court found that the
defendant could not complain of the intrusion upon his private
telephone calls because there had been no physical entry onto his
property 25 The Court stated that the language of the fourth
amendment "shows that the.search is to be of material things -
the person, the house, his papers or his effects." 28 Thus, the Court
found that a fourth amendment search necessarily involves a
trespass.
The Court reached a similar result in Goldman, in which
agents obtained evidence in an investigation of an attorney by at-
taching a detectaphone, a small sound amplification device,
against a partition wall of the attorney's office .2  Finding that
Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765)).
Justice Bradley, speaking for the majority in Boyd, commented on Lord Camden's
pronouncements, stating that "[i]t is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of
his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the invasion of his indefea-
sible right of personal security, personal liberty and private property which underlies
and constitutes the essence of Lord Camden's judgment." Id. at 630. While Justice Bradley
spoke in the more expansive terms of "liberty" and "security," the connection between
privacy and physical trespass is evident and controlled fourth amendment thinking for the
following eighty years.
21. 277 U.S. 438 (1928), rev d, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
22. 316 U.S. 129 (1942), revd, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
23. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 456.
24. Id. at 466.
25. On this point, Chief Justice Taft added:
The reasonable view is that one who installs in his house a telephone instrument
with connecting wires intends to project his voice to those quite outside, and that
the wires beyond his house and messages while passing over them are not within
the protection of the Fourth Amendment. Here those who intercepted the pro-
jected voices were not in the house of either party to the conversation.
Id. at 466.
26. Id. at 465.
27. Id. at 466 (There is no violation of the fourth amendment "unless there has been
an official search and seizure of [a] person, or such a seizure of his papers or his tangible
material effects, or an actual physical invasion of his house 'or curtilage' for the purpose of
making a seizure.").
28. Goldman, 316 U.S. at 131.
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there was no trespass when the detectaphone was placed against
the partition wall, the Court concluded that there had been no
search.29
Justice Brandeis, in Olmstead, and Justice Murphy, in
Goldman, issued scathing dissents. In what is possibly his most
famous dissent, Brandeis noted that "[t]ime works changes, brings
into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore a principle
to be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief
which gave it birth. This is particularly true of constitutions.""0
Later, Justice Murphy echoed Brandeis's admonitions, urging that
the Court not construe the fourth amendment literally in order to
limit its application "to those evils and phenomena that were con-
temporary with its framing." 31 Recognizing the vast technological
changes that were occurring, these dissents presaged the dissatis-
faction with the restrictive property-based approach to the fourth
amendment. In Goldman, Justice Murphy further argued that
there was no "rational basis for denying to the modern means of
communication the same protection that is extended by the
Amendment to the sealed letter in the mails."32 Unfortunately, his
reasoning remained unheeded for over twenty years.33
29. Id. at 134.
30. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 472-73 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
31. Goldman, 316 U.S. at 138 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 141.
33. The archaic approach taken in Goldman was an adequate test given the state of
technological development at the time. Surveillance technology was just starting to evolve
due to wartime research. When Goldman was decided, people could retire to their homes
when they wished to be sheltered from governmental intrusion. However, this security was
rapidly disappearing. In his dissent in Goldman, Justice Murphy argued for the need to
liberalize fourth amendment protection to adapt to a changing community, stating that
"[i]t is our duty to see that this historic provision receives a construction sufficiently liberal
and elastic to make it serve the needs and manners of each succeeding generation." Id. at
138. He further urged that "we should not permit any of the essentials of freedom to lose
vitality through legal interpretations that are restrictive and inadequate for the period in
which we live." Id. at 142.
Professor Anthony Amsterdam has urged the Court to expand the protections of the
fourth amendment to reflect current social conditions. His proposition addresses the
problems of the increasing urbanization of society:
To us it seems intuitively evident that anything a person does within sight or
hearing of his neighbors or the general public is not private-and that, as to
such things, it makes no difference whether they are observed by a neighbor or a
policeman-because we retire to our homes when we want real privacy. But if
you live in a cheap hotel or in a ghetto flat, your neighbors can hear you breath-
ing quietly even in temperate weather when it is possible to keep the windows
and doors closed. For the tenement dweller, the difference between the observa-
tion by neighbors and visitors who ordinarily use the common hallways and ob-
[Vol. 41:581
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Just as the concept of trespass onto property provided the an-
alytical framework for the audio surveillance cases, courts solved
the problem of trash searches by resorting to the property law
concept of "abandonment."'" Work v United States 5 and United
States v Minker 6 illustrate the application of this doctrine. In
each case, the court focused on whether the articles retrieved in a
warrantless trash reconnaissance were abandoned.3 1 In Work, po-
lice received information that the defendant was using narcotics in
her home.38 After police officers unlawfully entered her home, the
defendant exited the house and deposited the narcotics in a trash
can underneath the porch of the house.39 The court found that the
evidence was suppressible because the defendant did not intend to
abandon the narcotics, but was trying to hide them from the po-
lice officers.' 0
In Minker, Internal Revenue Service agents investigating an
illegal gambling operation searched the dumpster of the defend-
ant's apartment complex.41 The agents found adding machine
tapes and other wagering paraphernalia in the dumpster. 42 The
court held that the evidence was admissible because it had been
abandoned and therefore no search had occurred.43
B. Katz v United States: Abrogating the Property Law
Approach
Growing dissatisfaction with the rigidity of property law con-
cepts in fourth amendment analysis culminated in 1967 in Katz v
servation by policemen who come into the hallways to "check up" or "look
around" is the difference between all the privacy that his condition allows and
none. Is that small difference too unimportant to claim fourth amendment
protection?
Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 404 (1974)
(emphasis in original).
34. W LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.6(c) (2d ed. Supp. 1986).
35. 243 F.2d 660 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
36. 312 F.2d 632 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 953 (1963).
37. W LAFAVE, supra note 34, § 2.6, at 476; see Minker, 312 F.2d at 634-35;
Work, 243 F.2d at 662-63.
38. 243 F.2d at 661.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 662.
41. Minker, 312 F.2d at 634.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 634-35. The court found, in part, that the materials were abandonded
because the receptacle was outside the defendant's apartment complex and was used by
several tenants. Id.
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United States." The defendant in Katz entered a public phone
booth allegedly to transmit gambling information.45 FBI agents
had attached a listening device to the top of the booth.4 6 The Su-
preme Court, stating that "the Fourth Amendment protects peo-
ple, not places,"'4 7 ordered the suppression of the evidence gath-
ered through the device. 48 The significance of this opinion lies in
the Court's acknowledgement that individuals retain some degree
of privacy with regard to evidence gathered without a physical
trespass.4 9
Katz is noteworthy in at least two other respects. First, it ad-
dressed the inroads made by advanced technology in surveillance
of citizens in their homes. Second, it viewed the citizen's right to
privacy as ambulatory; that is, privacy rights and expectations
warrant respect wherever the person goes.50
Katz was truly a landmark opinion in fourth amendment ju-
risprudence, but it failed to articulate a sufficiently concrete test.
Consequently, Justice Harlan's separate concurrence became the
source of the current test, commonly known as the "expectation of
privacy" analysis. 51 Justice Harlan conceived of this analysis as "a
twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expecta-
tion be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasona-
ble.'"52 The two-prong test was seized upon by the Court as a
means to gauge the limits of fourth amendment protection without
resorting to property law concepts. Unfortunately, in light of its
progeny, Katz has had little effect in changing the fundamental
manner in which the Court has addressed many fourth amend-
ment issues. As one observer has noted, "[U]se of concepts
44. 389 U.S. 351 (1967).
45. Id. at 348.
46. Id. at 348-49.
47. Id. at 351.
48. See id. at 359.
49. The Court stated that "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in
his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection But what
he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitu-
tionally protected." Id. at 351-52 (citations omitted).
50. "No less than an individual in a business office, in a friend's apartment, or in a
taxicab, a person in a telephone booth may rely upon the protection of the Fourth Amend-
ment." Id. at 352 (footnotes omitted) (citing Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960)),
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), and Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United
States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920)).
51. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
52. Id. (Harlan, J., concurring).
[Vol. 41:581
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[such as abandonment] has persisted long after Katz. .[E]ven
the Greenwood Court is unable to avoid an indirect reliance on
these concepts."53 Indeed, the Court has not remained true to
its pronouncement in Katz. The Court's expectation-of-privacy
analysis has become a veil for an abandonment analysis.
II. "ABANDONMENT" LINGERS ON IN CURRENT FOURTH
AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
Although the Supreme Court has abjured an analysis based
expressly on abandonment in fourth amendment cases, state and
lower federal courts implicitly have maintained abandonment as
the method of resolving trash reconnaissance disputes.54 Further-
more, the Supreme Court itself has applied a veiled abandonment
analysis; California v Greenwood exemplifies this approach.5
While the Greenwood case speaks in terms other than those nor-
mally encountered in an abandonment case, the meaning of its
terminology is consistent with the classic abandonment analysis.
A. The Greenwood Analysis: Voluntary Relinquishment to
Third Parties
In 1984 a Laguna Beach, California Police Department in-
vestigator was informed that Billy Greenwood would receive a
shipment of drugs at his residence.5 6 This information was corrob-
orated by neighbors' complaints of heavy, late-night traffic in
front of Greenwood's home. Based on this information, the investi-
53. Note, Supreme Court Decides, supra note 15, at I 195.
54. See United States v. Dela Espriella, 781 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1986); United
States v. Terry, 702 F.2d 299 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Williams v. United States,
461 U.S. 931 (1983); United States v. Reicherter, 647 F.2d 397 (3d Cir. 1981); United
States v. Vahalik, 606 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1081 (1980); United
States v. Crowell, 586 F.2d 1020 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 959 (1979);
Magda v. Benson, 536 F.2d 111 (6th Cir. 1976); United States v. Mustone, 469 F.2d 970
(Ist Cir. 1972). A New Jersey appellate court recently invoked abandonment theory, hold-
ing "that police may search without a warrant through abandoned household refuse
" State v. Pasanen, 229 N.J. Super. 553, 556, 552 A.2d 212, 213 (1989), revd sub
nom. State v. Hempele, 120 N.J. 182, 576 A.2d 793 (1990) (emphasis added).
55. The majority in Greenwood cited numerous federal circuit court cases in support
of its claim that curbside trash was not protected under an expectation-of-privacy analysis.
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 41-42 (1988). However, as pointed out in Justice
Brennan's dissent, most of these cases denied protection to curbside trash "entirely or al-
most entirely on an abandonment theory that the Court has discredited." Id. at 49 n.2
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
56. Id. at 37.
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gator asked the neighborhood trash disposal workers to separate
Greenwood's trash from the other trash in the neighborhood. An
examination of the contents produced evidence of narcotics. Based
on this evidence, the investigator was able to secure search war-
rants for Greenwood's home. A search of the home resulted in the
arrest of Greenwood on felony narcotics charges. Another investi-
gator obtained a second search warrant and an arrest after he per-
formed a similar reconnaissance of Greenwood's trash.5 7
At trial, the indictments against Greenwood and his co-de-
fendant were dismissed.58 The trial court ruled that the search
warrants issued for Greenwood's house were tainted by the war-
rantless reconnaissance of Greenwood's trash .5  The trial court
based its ruling on the authority of People v Krivda,60 in which
the California Supreme Court held that both the fourth amend-
ment of the United States Constitution and its California counter-
part6 l recognize that citizens have "a reasonable expectation that
their trash [will] not be rummaged through and picked over by
police officers acting without a search warrant. 62 Since the war-
rantless reconnaissance of trash was invalid, there was no proba-
ble cause for the issuance of the search warrants.6 3 The Court of
Appeals affirmed, and the California Supreme Court denied
review 64
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari
and specifically reversed that part of the Krvda holding that ex-
tended federal constitutional protection to curbside trash recon-
naissance.6 5 The Court's approach to this issue was similar to its
analysis of other troublesome fourth amendment issues, such as
57. Id. at 37-38.
58. Id. at 38.
59. Id.
60. 5 Cal. 3d 357, 486 P.2d 1262, 96 Cal. Rptr. 62 (1971), vacated, California v.
Krivda, 409 U.S. 33 (1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 919 (1973).
61. CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 19.
62. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d at 367, 486 P.2d at 1268, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 68, cited in Califor-
nia v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 38 (1988).
63. Greenwood, 486 U.S. at, 38. California, Hawaii, and New Jersey are presently
the only states that interpret their state constitutions to require search warrants for curb-
side trash reconnaissance. See, e.g., Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 357, 486 P.2d 1262, 96 Cal. Rptr.
62; People v. Edwards, 71 Cal. 2d 1096, 458 P.2d 713, 80 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969); State v.
Tanaka, 67 Haw. 658, 701 P.2d 1274 (1985); State v. Hempele, 120 N.J. 182, 576 A.2d
793 (1990).




searches of pen registers6 and bank records. 67 The Court found
that by voluntarily placing the trash in an area where it was read-
ily accessible to the public, Greenwood's subjective expectation
that the contents of his trash would remain private was not "ob-
jectively reasonable."68 In reversing Krivda, the Greenwood Court
compared its decision to that in Smith v Maryland.69 The Smith
Court held that the identity of the phone numbers dialed is not
protected under the fourth amendment because those numbers are
voluntarily revealed to the telephone company for billing pur-
poses.70 By analogy, the same rationale was deemed to apply to a
search of Greenwood's garbage. The essence of the decision in
Greenwood, as in Smith v Maryland, is that an individual can
harbor "no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he
voluntarily turns over to third parties."'7
B. "Voluntary Conveyance to Third Parties" A New Label
for Abandonment Analysis
The Greenwood Court has attempted to maintain a consistent
approach to its analysis of fourth amendment issues by avoiding
any discussion of "abandonment" as an analytical approach. How-
ever, it appears that Greenwood uses the language of privacy to
mask an abandonment approach.72
66. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (holding that the use of pen regis-
ters to track phone numbers dialed by a defendant is not a search).
67. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (holding that police examina-
tion of defendant's bank records is not a search).
68. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988). The Court concluded that the
respondents exposed their garbage in a way that relinquished any fourth amendment claim.
"Animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public" have access to
garbage left on or at the curbside. Id.
69. 442 U.S. 735 (1975).
70. Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 41.
71. Id. (quoting Smith, 442 U.S. at 743-44). Notably absent from Justice White's
majority opinion is his usual recital that the property law concept of abandonment does not
offer a mechanism through which to set the bounds of fourth amendment protection. In the
previous term, Justice White, dissenting in California v. Rooney, 483 U.S. 307, 320 (1987),
stated that the question in Rooney was not whether the defendant had abandoned his inter-
est, but whether society viewed as reasonable his subjective expectation of privacy in his
trash bag.
72. Justice Brennan made this argument in his dissent, claiming that "even the vol-
untary relinquishment of possession or control over an effect does not necessarily amount to
a relinquishment of a privacy expectation in it." Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 55 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Implicit in this statement is Justice Brennan's recognition that the majority has
drawn a distinction based on whether trash is abandoned and that, after Katz, even aban-
doned objects deserve fourth amendment coverage. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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While the Court speaks of voluntarily conveying one's trash
to third parties 73 or voluntarily placing one's trash in a place ac-
cessible to the public,7 4 it could equally claim that the trash was
abandoned under property law concepts.7 5 It may well be that the
focus is shifted from "abandonment" as relinquishing physical
control over property to "abandonment" as relinquishing a right
- an expectation of privacy 76 A number of courts have main-
tained that abandonment in the fourth amendment context refers
to "whether there has been abandonment of a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy as to the area searched or the property seized." '77
However, it is unclear how the two approaches truly differ from
one another. The First Circuit, in United States v Mustone,7 8 at-
tempted to reconcile the abandonment approach with the expecta-
tion of privacy approach. Yet the decision merely emphasizes the
underlying role of abandonment, asserting that "[i] mplicit in the
concept of abandonment is a renunciation of any 'reasonable' ex-
pectation of privacy in the property abandoned.'7 9 If placing one's
trash in an area where it is accessible to the public is dispositive or
even highly probative of whether it deserves fourth amendment
protection, then the Court has merely restated the old maxim that
what is abandoned is unprotected.80 That is, by concluding that
the defendant's act of placing his trash in a public place vitiates
any objectively reasonable expectation of privacy, the Greenwood
Court has not truly divorced itself from an abandonment analysis.
This is necessarily the case, given the definition of abandonment
as "an intention to relinquish all title, possession, or claim to prop-
73. Id. at 40.
74. Id.
75. "In cases factually similar to Greenwood, the accepted rule is that the act of
placing one's garbage outside the home for collection constitutes abandonment of the prop-
erty." Note, Supreme Court Decides, supra note 15, at 1195.
76. See Note, Trashing, supra note 15, at 605.
77. United States v. Kahan, 350 F Supp. 784, 795 (S.D.N.Y 1972); see State v.
Oquist, 327 N.W.2d 587, 590 (Minn. 1982) ("[T]he question is whether the defendant
has, in discarding the property, relinquished his expectation of privacy with respect to the
property ").
78. 469 F.2d 970 (ist Cir. 1972).
79. Id. at 972 (emphasis added).
80. See Note, California v. Greenwood: Discarding the Traditional Approach to the
Search and Seizure of Garbage, 38 CATH. U.L. REv. 543, 568 (1989) ("Justice White
simply could have equated [the respondents'] property interest in the trash with their pri-
vacy interest in it: having voluntarily abandoned their ownership interest, respondents could
no longer reasonably expect society to support whatever subjective expectation they may
have initially held in their trash.").
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erty, accompanied by some type of activity or omission [manifest-
ing such intention,]" 81 or a renunciation of any privacy interest in
a thing. 2
This note will now examine the Court's rationale for its veiled
abandonment analysis and how Justice Harlan's two-prong test in
Katz inevitably leads to this veiled abandonment analysis. First,
however, one assumption must be expressed and proven: curbside
trash is abandoned, and any other interpretation is inconsistent
with the reasonable expectation of the average person. This as-
sumption establishes the nexus between the Greenwood Court's
stated approach and the archaic abandonment approach. The
strongest argument against this assumption is that municipal ordi-
nances mandating particular methods of trash disposal eliminate
the element of intent needed for a finding of abandonmenf.
1. Municipal Ordinances Do Not Destroy the Necessary
Volition Required for a Finding of Abandonment
Because it is defined as a voluntary relinquishment of claim
to the property, abandonment is often an issue of intent.8 3 Placing
one's garbage at the curb on the day designated for pickup by the
disposal contractor arguably demonstrates the requisite voluntary
relinquishment of possession and control.
A number of authors have attacked the Court's Greenwood
pronouncement on the grounds that many municipal ordinances
provide only one procedure for trash disposal.84 They contend that
such ordinances eliminate the volition necessary for a finding of
abandonment.8 5 However, this argument is unpersuasive because
it is based on the premise that privacy, for purposes of the fourth
amendment, concerns only those objects which would be incrimi-
nating in a criminal law context. As Professor Schulhofer notes,
81. Mascolo, The Role of Abandonment in the Law of Search and Seizure: An Ap-
plication of Misdirected Emphasis, 20 BUFFALO L. REv. 399, 401-02 (1971).
82. See Mustone, 469 F.2d at 972.
83. Mascolo, supra note 81, at 401.
84. See, e.g., ORANGE COUNTY. CAL., CODE § 4-3-45(a) (1986) (requiring that all
trash be removed from a residential dwelling at least once a week); Id. § 3-3-85 (1988)
(prohibiting residential dwellers from burning brush, logs, fallen timber, or any other flam-
mable material), cited in California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 48 (1988).
85. See, e.g., Note, Further Erosion, supra note 15, at 645 ("The Greenwood major-
ity failed to acknowledge that if a citizen must break the law to avoid voluntarily exposing
the contents of his or her garbage can to public scrutiny, the crux of the issue is compul-
sion, not consent.").
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"[A] real crook is not likely to toss his smoking gun into his own
trash barrel. And he is subject to search on probable cause any-
way Why should the rest of us have to put up with this sort of
intrusion in the absence of probable cause 9"' 6 While it is true that
local ordinances compel individuals to expose that which they
would not otherwise expose due to its incriminating nature, most
trash is non-incriminatory 87
Even assuming that an individual is aware of those laws man-
dating a particular method of trash disposal, the nature of the
objects discarded will affect the intent of the individual. An indi-
vidual who wishes to discard an incriminating object would likely
prefer to dispose of it in a surreptitious manner. This demon-
strates a heightened awareness of the law requiring disclosure.
One might conclude that the disposal of the incriminating article
was, in a sense, forced or compelled, rather than intentional. 88
The disposal of routine household refuse, however, does not
evidence a heightened awareness of those same laws or ordi-
nances. Rather, disposal in the prescribed method is the most eco-
nomically efficient practice. Furthermore, if there were a choice of
methods of disposal, most people presumably would choose the
manner prescribed by law 89 In such a case, the applicable munici-
pal ordinances do not alter the volitional nature of the act. There-
fore, municipal ordinances that mandate a particular method of
disposal do not diminish the volition necessary to a finding of
abandonment.
Privacy is far more pervasive than the desire to conceal in-
criminating objects. Even the most routine items of trash may re-
86. Schulhofer, The Constitution and the Police: Individual Rights and Law En-
forcement, 66 WASH. U.L.Q. 11, 27-28 (1989) (emphasis in original).
87. While not literally incriminating, much household trash reveals information a
resident would prefer to keep private. See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
88. See Mascolo, supra note 81, at 419-20.
89. For an apt analogy, see Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d
590, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1974). In that case, the California Supreme Court suppressed
bank records searched and seized by agents. In discussing the claim that such records are
voluntarily conveyed to the bank, the court asserted that a depositor makes this disclosure
for the limited purpose of facilitating banking affairs. Id. at 244, 529 P.2d at 594, 118 Cal.
Rptr. at 170. Similarly, most homeowners or apartment dwellers convey their garbage to
the trash collectors for the equally limited purpose of facilitating a sanitary home environ-
ment. The methods designated by law appear to be the most efficient means of doing this.
Moreover, it does not appear that the average person disposes of trash in the prescribed
manner due to compulsion by the government. Rather, regulated trash disposal is a wel-
come means of achieving the social good of a clean living environment.
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veal intimate aspects of one's personal life.90 The right to privacy
remains no less important, even as regards the most mundane
items people discard.
Given the fact that curbside trash is, technically, abandoned,
the Court's conclusion that society does not accept that there is an
expectation of privacy in trash voluntarily placed in an area acces-
sible to the public simply amounts to a conclusion that there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy in abandoned objects. This is
entirely consistent with a whole body of fourth amendment case
law 91 Furthermore, despite the Court's attempts to disclaim such
an approach, its treatment of the issue is entirely consistent with
an abandonment analysis. However, the Court's approach fails to
examine the intent of the defendant, thereby giving the first prong
of the Katz test only cursory treatment.92 Instead, the Court as-
sumes that placing the object (trash) where the public can see it
renders any expectation of privacy with regard to the object un-
justified, regardless of any attempts to safeguard its contents. The
end result is that the Greenwood Court has not done anything dif-
ferent from those lower courts that resolve the fourth amendment
issue "in essentially the same way as in Work and Minker
"93
90. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 50 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("A
single bag of trash testifies eloquently to the eating, reading, and recreational habits of the
person who produced it. A search of trash, like a search of the bedroom, can relate inti-
mate details about sexual practices, health, and personal hygiene."). It is often suggested
that to keep something private, one should simply refrain from putting it in the trash.
Therefore, compelled exposure of that which would otherwise remain concealed does not
constitute abandonment. Mascolo, supra note 81, at 418. Thus, it is argued, what a person
places into the trash is discarded voluntarily; if there were something to hide, an alternative
means of disposal would have been found. However, such an argument fails to perceive the
true dimensions of privacy. Privacy involves not only an individual's right to avoid or en-
gage in self-incrimination, but also society's respect for that individual. "[R]espect for
someone as a person, as a chooser, implie[s] respect for him as one engaged on a kind of
self-creative enterprise, which could be disrupted, distorted, or frustrated even by so limited
an intrusion as watching." Benn, Privacy, Freedom, and Respect for Persons, in PHILO-
SOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY 223, 242 (F Schoeman ed. 1984).
91.. As Professor Mascolo has noted, abandonment presents no issue of search or
seizure. See Mascolo, supra note 81, at 401.
92. Characteristically, the Court uncritically accepts any assertion by a defendant of
a subjective expectation of privacy in his or her trash. See, e.g., Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 39
("It may well be that respondents did not expect that the contents of their garbage bags
would become known to the police or to other members of the public."); California v.
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) ("Clearly - and understandably - respondent has met
the test of manifesting his own subjective intent and desire to maintain [his] privacy
93. W LAFAvE, supra note 34, at 476. Justice Brennan's dissent in Greenwood illus-
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It is clear that the Katz majority did not contemplate the
nexus between the Greenwood Court's articulated approach and
the abandonment approach discredited in cases such as California
v Rooney"' Factually, Greenwood and Katz are fundamentally
identical. The divergent results serve to highlight the interrelation
the Greenwood Court sees between abandonment and privacy
analysis. Examination of this divergence will aid in analyzing this
nexus.
2. Katz and Greenwood - Fundamentally Similar Facts,
Radically Different Results: Where Greenwood Falters
The facts in Greenwood are essentially identical to the facts
in Katz. Both cases involved receptacles (Greenwood's trash can
and Katz's telephone booth) situated in public places. In each
case, the "receptacle" contained evidence of some particular detail
of the defendant's private activity The Court sought to distin-
guish the two by urging that the likelihood of public apprehension
was significantly greater in Greenwood.95 However, the opposite
may be true. A public phone booth is not immune to invasion by
others. Any passerby could have heard Katz's conversation More-
over, the glass booth provides no protection from a person able to
read lips.9" Therefore, under the facts in Greenwood "[t]he mere
possibility that unwelcome meddlers might open and rummage
through the containers does not negate the expectation of privacy
in its contents "197 any more than did the fact that someone
might have barged into Katz's phone booth and overheard partic-
ularly incriminating segments of his phone call. In Katz, however,
trates the curious nature of the majority opinion. First, he asserts that the Court properly
rejected the state's claim that there is no expectation of privacy in garbage left at the
curbside because it is abandonded. Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 51 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Then, he argues that "even the voluntary relinquishment of control over an effect does not
necessarily amount to a relinquishment of the privacy expectation in it." Id. at 55 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting). The basis of the majority's holding is uncertain, given the fact that a
voluntary relinquishment of control is, by definition, an abandonment. See Mascolo, supra
note 81, at 401-02.
94. 483 U.S. 307 (1987).
95. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988); see State .v. Ronngren, 361
N.W.2d 224 (N.D. 1985) (defendant's fourth amendment rights were not violated when a
dog dragged the defendant's trash bag into a neighbor's yard and the neighbor consented to
a search of the bag).
96. Lecture by Lewis R. Katz, John C. Hutchins Professor of Law, at Case Western
Reserve University School of Law (1990).
97. Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 54 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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the Court was more concerned with a factual account of the de-
fendant's own understanding of the situation, asserting that
"[o]ne who occupies [the booth], shuts the door behind him, and
pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to
assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be
broadcast to the world." ' In Greenwood, the Court did not look
as far. Rather, it simply found that the defendant acted in a place
where intrusion was possible. By voluntarily assuming that risk"
the defendant necessarily gave up control, possession, and domin-
ion over the object. Such relinquishment of control is, no doubt,
an abandonment. However, the Court preferred to speak in terms
of relinquishment of fourth amendment protection.100 Nonetheless,
the nexus is implicitly present - abandonment is highly proba-
tive, if not dispositive, of the limits of fourth amendment
protection.10
Inasmuch as the facts in Katz and Greenwood are fundamen-
tally identical, the analyses leading to these divergent results
merit examination. As previously demonstrated, the Greenwood
Court employed a veiled abandonment approach. The Katz Court,
on the other hand, specifically denounced such an approach. In
doing so, it reached a conclusion contrary to that in Greenwood.
The divergence results from the Greenwood Court's skewed inter-
pretation of Katz, particularly Justice Harlan's two-prong analy-
sis. It is evident that the Court's interpretation of Katz is wholly
at odds with the expressed aims of Katz.
III. WHY THE COURT Is FORCED INTO AN ABANDONMENT
ANALYSIs: THE NEED FOR A GENERALIZED AND SELF-
VALIDATING OBJECTIVE CRITERION
Why, despite its protestations to the contrary, is the Supreme
98. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).
99. Schulhofer, supra note 86, at 25 (arguing that a risk of public revelation is
assumed when one voluntarily conveys information to another); see Smith v. Maryland,
442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979) (caller assumes the risk that numbers he or she dials may be
revealed by the telephone company to third parties); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435,
442-43 (1976) (patron assumes the risk of bank records being revealed by the bank to
police or prosecutors).
100. Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40.
101. Mascolo, supra note 81, at 401; see Note, supra note 80, at 559 ("After Katz,
courts typically resolved the problem of trash searches by applying the abandoned property
standard, modified by the reasonable expectation of privacy test; individuals surrender their
privacy expectation when they discard their trash.").
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Court using an abandonment approach in its analysis of numerous
fourth amendment issues9 Why has the Court failed to formulate
an analytical framework that gives substantial effect to its oft-
cited pronouncement that "the Fourth Amendment protects peo-
ple, not places [,] what [a person] seeks to preserve as private,
even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected9 "' 0 2
A. The Lack of Interplay Between the Strands of the Two-
Prong Test: The Emergence of the Abstract Question, "What Is
Reasonable 9 "
The answer lies in the interpretation of the Katz test by sub-
sequent courts. Harlan's two-prong inquiry'03 fails to capture the
spirit of the Katz holding. Consequently, the Court has given only
cursory consideration to the specific facts of each case, relying in-
stead on a more abstract value judgment - one which depends on
the values of the individual members of the Court.10 4
In Katz, Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, ruled that
fourth amendment inquiry should focus on people rather than
places.0 5 The Court discarded the concept of "constitutionally
protected area[s]" as a method of describing either what was pro-
tected or where a person was protected. 06 Inasmuch as the Katz
majority contemplated a keenly person-oriented approach to the
fourth amendment, Justice Harlan's two-prong test is inadequate.
The Greenwood Court's rationale is anything but a person-ori-
ented approach.
102. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967); see Warden v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294, 304 (1966) ("The premise that property interests control the right of the
Government to search and seize has been discredited.").
103. See supra text accompanying note 52.
104. Justices Brennan and Marshall consistently have dissented in cases in which the
Court has denied fourth amendment protection. In most of these cases, their arguments
have simply rejected the majority Justices' value judgments in favor of their own. See, e.g.,
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 51 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Most of us, I
believe, would be incensed to discover a meddler scrutinizing our sealed trash contain-
ers to discover some details of our personal lives."); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 751
(1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Privacy in placing calls is of value not only to those
engaged in criminal activity. The prospect of unregulated governmental monitoring will
undoubtedly prove disturbing even to those with nothing illicit to hide."); United States v.
Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 451 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("In the course of such deal-
ings, a depositor reveals many aspects of his personal affairs, opinions, habits and
associations.").
105. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
106. Id. at 350.
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Because the Greenwood analysis focuses on the second prong
of the test,""7 the Court is narrowly limited in its investigation of
specific facts concerning methods and manners in which individu-
als perform particular acts, whether in private or in public. Such
fact-specific inquiries are impossible where the Court must make a
prophylactic ruling on what society generally perceives as reasona-
ble and legitimate. A test which is merely an estimation of social
values renders subjective analysis virtually meaningless. Instead,
the Court must devise a fairly generalized ruling which conveys
the message that, at some point, an individual's conduct is no
longer reasonable from society's standpoint. Professor Uviller, dis-
cussing this pure "reasonability" standard, notes that
[t]his philosophy deserves appreciation. It is, after all,
in the best tradition of our common-law system of judge-made
law. It will, as did the common law, naturally yield generaliza-
tions, which in turn will be formulated into canons if not codes,
and the police will as surely instruct recruits according to the
supposed precepts underlying the individual decisions.108
Unfortunately, these "generalizations" account for the Court's in-
ability to escape from any analytical model which does not em-
brace the abandonment theory
B. "Where" Versus "How" Providing the Easiest Answer to
an Abstract Question
As noted above, when the Court decides whether the fourth
amendment will apply to a particular case, it simply determines
what is abstractly reasonable. It does not look to what is reasona-
ble in consideration of all the facts unique to the particular case.
Logic requires that the former question be answered by a genera-
lized statement concerning a broad category of activities. Further-
more, this generalized solution necessarily involves a value judg-
ment; the Court merely surmises the reaction of the majority of
Americans to the broad category of activities under discussion.
107. See Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 41 ("[o]ur conclusion that society would not ac-
cept as reasonable respondents' claim to an expectation of privacy"); California v. Ciraolo,
476 U.S. 207, 214 (1986) ("we readily conclude that respondent's expectation that his
garden was protected from such observation is unreasonable"); Miller, 425 U.S. at 442
("We must examine the nature of the particular documents sought to be protected to de-
termine whether there is a legitimate 'expectation of privacy' concerning their contents.").
108. Uviller, Reasonability and the Fourth Amendment: A (Belated) Farewell to
Justice Potter Stewart, 25 CRIm. L. BULL. 29, 36 (1989).
5991991]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
The inherent dilemma is that persuasive answers can be given on
either side of the issue, none of which are incorrect.10 9 The dis-
tinction between the two questions posed above is crucial to fourth
amendment jurisprudence.
The Court's phrasing of the question yields an easily applica-
ble rule for the law enforcement agent who will ultimately have to
make the day-to-day decisions concerning searches and
seizures. 110 Thus, the Court may have made a policy decision to
prefer efficient law enforcement to extensive fourth amendment
coverage. In any event, when the inquiry focuses on reasonable-
ness, the court must strive to create a test that produces univer-
sally consistent results for a very broad range of factual scenarios
within one general category of activity Trash disposal, dialing
phone numbers, and depositing bank funds exemplify broad cate-
gories of activity But in asking the abstract question, the Court
must forego analyzing the particular factual complexities of each
case. Instead it must make a more generalized inquiry
Curbside trash is abandoned. This fact is implicit in recent
cases and was consistently and explicitly determined in older
cases. Moreover, the Greenwood Court is correct to assert that, in
general, it is unreasonable to expect abandoned property to re-
main private. However, this admission is made with the caveat
that it is limited only to the abstract, general case. An expectation
of privacy may be justified given a more specific factual account-
ing. The value judgment that one cannot have a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in abandoned property is a justifiable generaliza-
tion. However, recognizing that a generalization is only the mean
109. Consider, for example, the conception of American values asserted by Judge
Anstead dissenting in State v. Schultz, 388 So. 2d 1326 (Fla. 1980):
In my view, a homeowner, upon placing items in a closed garbage container and
placing the container in a position on his property where the container can be
conveniently removed by authorized trash collectors, is entitled to reasonably
expect that the container and the trash therein will be removed from his prop-
erty only by those authorized to do so, and that such trash will be disposed of in
a manner provided by ordinance or private contract Consider the average
citizen who, upon the occasion of taking his trash out to the front of his property
on the day appointed for collection, reenters his house and almost immediately
notices his next door neighbor rushing out to rifle through the trash that is con-
tained in the covered containers. What would his reaction be? I suggest he
would be absolutely incensed.
Id. at 1330-31.
110. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181-82 (1984) (arguing that an ad




conclusion of a varied array of results, the court should always
determine whether the generalization is sufficiently rebutted in the
case at hand. Just as an apparent case of abandonment may, upon
further inspection, turn out not to be such a case,""" a justified
case of abandonment should not always prevent application of the
fourth amendment. 12 However, unless the further inquiry is
made, the fourth amendment will afford no protection. Therefore,
a determination that no fourth amendment protection extends to
information voluntarily conveyed to third persons'"3 represents a
validation of the generalized value judgment that there can be no
reasonable expectation of privacy in abandoned objects.
The Court engages in a veiled abandonment analysis in that
it makes the wrong inquiry in determining the limits of the fourth
amendment. The Court is mislead by its interpretation of Justice
Harlan's two-prong test as involving no connection between the
two prongs. The Court explains the test as if a connection exists,
but the connection is actually a fiction. Rather, the two-prong test
involves two distinct inquiries. The first relates to the defendant's
subjective awareness. But, as noted above, this inquiry usually
ends with the defendant's unsupported assertion of an expectation
of privacy in the trash." 4 Then, rather than using the second
prong as a check on the first, the Court employs the second prong
in an abstract manner by asking "what is reasonable'?" as opposed
to "is the defendant's assertion truthful from an objective stand-
point?" The latter approach requires a more fact-specific analysis
by the Court to determine whether the particular facts serve to
rebut the asserted expectation.
The application of the two-prong test as two distinct inquiries
explains the divergent results in Katz and Greenwood. Katz, like
Greenwood, acted in a public setting. Yet the Court employed dif-
ferent analyses in the two cases. In Katz the inquiry focused on
how the defendant acted, regardless of the defendant's location.
I 1I. Professor Mascolo advocates a fact-specific inquiry into every apparent case of
abandonment because, upon further inspection, what looks like an abandonment may not
be. For instance, a person who, fearing an imminent confrontation with a policeman, dis-
cards an incriminating object instead of risking its discovery during a frisk may not have
abandoned the object because of the element of compulsion. Mascolo, supra note 81, at
418-20. Hence, if police activity "prompt[s] the victim into revealing what would otherwise
be the product of an unreasonable search and seizure," Id. at 419, there cannot be an
abandonment.
112. See W. LAFAVE, supra note 34, § 2.6(c) at 477.
113. See supra notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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Hence, in Katz, the public-private place distinction was abro-
gated."' Having placed a call in a public place was of no conse-
quence. In Greenwood, however, the desire for a universal objec-
tive standard led the court to narrow the inquiry to essentially the
one rejected in Katz. Had Greenwood truly followed the approach
taken in Katz, the result would have conformed to Justice Bren-
nan's argument:
Had Greenwood flaunted his intimate activity by strewing his
trash all over the curb for all to see I could accept the
Court's conclusion that an expectation of privacy would have
been unreasonable. But all that Greenwood "exposed
to the public," were the exteriors of several opaque, sealed
containers.
The mere possibility that unwelcome meddlers might open
and rummage through the containers does not negate the expec-
tation of privacy in its contents any more than the possibility of
a burglary negates an expectation of privacy in the home.116
The majority, however, failed to take this approach and chose in-
stead the more abstract approach, looking only to the ease of pub-
lic access to the area in which the thing or the activity is lo-
cated.1 7 Ready public access indicates the defendant's recognition
of a loss of control and dominion over the object. Insofar as such a
loss of control amounts to abandonment, 1 8 the Court holds that
society will not acknowledge any expectation of privacy that the
defendant may have with respect to that object." 9 The Greenwood
Court's approach has the advantage of allowing the Court to con-
dition a societal response, thus affirming its value judgment. How-
ever, this consideration is inappropriate because it seeks to achieve
socially acceptable results at the expense of fairness.
115. "What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office,
is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private,
even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967) (citations omitted).
116. Greenwood v. California, 486 U.S. 35, 54 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (ci-
tations omitted) (emphasis in original).
117. See supra text accompanying note 74.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 75-76.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 67-75.
[Vol. 41:581
RECYCLING ABANDONMENT
C. The Abstract Question and the Easy Answer: The Court
Conditions a Societal Response Rather Than an Individual
Response
Having placed all of its emphasis on the second prong of the
Katz test, the Court is able to make a tautological statement of
what society considers objectively reasonable. Because the Court's
rulings condition society's expectations, whatever the Court con-
cludes will accurately reflect societal expectations.
Attempts to mitigate the harsh results of the Court's pro-
nouncement of reasonable expectations of privacy can be readily
observed. Public awareness that trash is not subject to the warrant
requirement causes people to take greater precautions to protect
their trash from public disclosure. From the perspective of the in-
dividual, an unpopular decision has the effect of inducing the indi-
vidual to engage in behavior which manifests a certain demand for
privacy 120 Simply because the court claims that one does not have
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of his trash
does not cause individuals to cease seeking privacy for the con-
tents of their trash, within the limitations imposed upon the alter-
natives by local law 121 The desire for privacy and the measures
taken to secure it are increased rather than diminished.
The Greenwood Court's pronouncement is self-proving in that
it conditions a societal response that deviates from the individual
response.122 By claiming that society does not view an expectation
of privacy in trash as objectively reasonable, the Court sets a soci-
etal standard - in effect conditioning a societal response for fu-
1123ture cases. 2 But such a response only relates to how the individ-
120. See infra text accompanying note 137.
121. See, e.g., supra note 84.
122. Greenwood made a similar argument in a different context. His argument,
made on due process grounds, asserted that laws and judicial pronouncements tend to es-
tablish the objective views of society:
[T]he reasonableness of [the] Respondent's expectation of privacy must be seen
in the context of applicable state law. For to the extent that notions of a reason-
able expectation of privacy must rest in part on those expectations that society
will accept as reasonable, the pronouncements of that society on the subject
should not be ignored. Were [the] Respondent living in an area in which trash
was by law made available for public inspection on a regular basis, no expecta-
tion of privacy could be considered reasonable.
Respondent's Brief at 15-16, California v.'Greenwood, 485 U.S. 35 (1988) (No. 86-684).
123. One author explains the difference between the majority and dissenting opinions
in Greenwood by distinguishing between behavioral responses, which focus on society's
opinion of the reasonableness of the individual's behavior, and value-oriented responses,
which focus on society's overall view of the nature of the activity itself: "Justice White's
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ual views the situation with regard to other individuals. Regarding
one's self, the response to the situation is often entirely different
from the societal response.
IV ANALYZING BEHAVIORAL MANIFESTATIONS AS A CORRECT
APPROACH TO FOURTH AMENDMENT ISSUE RESOLUTION
The Greenwood decision does not embody a rejection of
traditional property law analysis of fourth amendment issues.
Moreover, the decision provides the Court with a societal re-
sponse-conditioning approach to the fourth amendment. It is now
necessary to examine whether such an approach was contemplated
in the Katz decision and then, if this were not contemplated, to
formulate an approach that is compatible with Katz.
The approach taken by the Greenwood Court is not the ap-
proach to fourth amendment issues contemplated by Katz. The
Katz majority contemplated a test that places far more emphasis
upon defendant's actual expectations, as gauged by the reasona-
bleness of their behavioral manifestations, than on the mere pass-
ing reference to the subjective belief of the defendant that the
Court makes in Greenwood.
The Court has claimed that any inquiry into the subjective
expectations of the defendant would be meaningless because issues
of proof would make it nearly impossible to challenge a defendant
who asserts a subjective expectation that the object discovered
would remain private. 124 This is certainly true under the two-
prong test that the Court has chosen to apply When the first
prong of the test is limited to an inquiry into whether the defend-
ant had an actual subjective expectation of privacy, there is no
standard by which to gauge the sincerity of an affirmative answer.
reasoning indicates that he believes the Katz social reasonableness inquiry is answered by
examining whether an individual's privacy expectation is currently subject to invasion. By
stressing the likelihood of Greenwood's privacy actually being invaded, Justice White
framed the Katz inquiry in pragmatic terms of actual probabilities." Note, Further Ero-
sion, supra note 15, at 636.
This distinction is valid, but in the reverse context. By holding that society does not
accept as objectively reasonable any expectation of privacy in the contents of one's gar-
bage, the Court is assessing the behavioral response of the community at large. Such an
assertion is merely a recognition that society does not "practice what it preaches." The
Court's analysis does not alter the individual's concept of privacy rights in one's own trash.
Individuals are apt to advocate a value-oriented response when it comes to their own trash
but express the societal behavioral response with respect to the trash of others. See id. at
636-37.
124. See Greenwood, 485 U.S. at 39-40; supra note 92.
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The two-prong test is disintegrative in the sense that the answer to
the second inquiry has no bearing on the truthfulness of the an-
swer given to the first inquiry Such a muting of the defendant's
subjective expectation is inconsistent with the majority opinion in
Katz.125
This is not to suggest that a defendant's asserted expectation
is dispositive of the matter for purposes of the fourth amend-
ment.126 However, Katz does stand for the expansion of the pro-
tections of the fourth amendment to the plethora of situations in
which the defendant both claims and manifests an expectation of
privacy The defendant's true intent can be measured against the
reasonable person's interpretation of the defendant's behavioral
manifestations. What society views as reasonable should be con-
strued not in the abstract, as in Greenwood; rather, it should be,
construed to act as a qualification, limitation, or standard for as-
sessing the truthfulness of a defendant's subjective demand for
coverage by the fourth amendment. This proposition is consistent
with the Katz concept that fourth amendment coverage is tied to
the individual's intent to actively assert a privacy interest in a
given situation.12
7
An apt analogy to the analysis proposed is the traditional
conceptual framework of contract law In fact, Justice Stewart's
majority opinion speaks in vaguely contractual terms, as if to im-
ply that promissory estoppel bars the government from rescinding
the promised protection of the fourth amendment. Justice Stewart
wrote: "The Government's activities in electronically listening to
and recording the petitioner's words violated the privacy upon
125. Professor Amsterdam asserts that "neither Katz nor the fourth amendment asks
what we expect of government. They tell us what we should demand of government." Am-
sterdam, supra note 33, at 384.
126. Professor Amsterdam further claims that the defendant's subjective expectation
"has no place in a statement of what Katz held or in a theory of what the fourth amend-
ment protects." Id.
127. For example, the Katz Court says that "what a person knowingly exposes to the
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection."
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). Further, the court explains, "[W]hat
[Katz] sought to exclude when he entered the booth was not the intruding eye - it was
the uninvited ear." Id. at 352 (emphasis added).
Even Justice Harlan agreed, "[A] man's home is, for most purposes, a place where he
expects privacy, but objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to the 'plain view' of
outsiders are not 'protected' because no intention to keep them to himself has been exhib-
ited." Id. at 361. Such a statement is a far cry from the characteristic deference with
which the modern court accepts any statement by the defendant that he has an actual
subjective expectation of privacy in the object searched.
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which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and
thus constituted a 'search and seizure' within the meaning of -the
Fourth Amendment. 128 Under contract law, the theory of prom-
issory estoppel enforces promises where the promisee detrimen-
tally and "justifiably relies" on the promise.129 Moreover, the
promisee's reliance on the promise is analyzed from the perspec-
tive of the reasonable person making an assessment of the prom-
isee's behavior. Applying this approach to Katz, the reasonable
person could conclude that Katz's actions were motivated by reli-
ance on the promise of the protections contained in the fourth
amendment. Perhaps Katz actually indicates a shift from property
law principles to contract law principles.130 At the very least, con-
tract concepts relating to proof are analogous to the type of proof
required to resolve fourth amendment issues.
Analyzing fourth amendment issues in this way avoids the
need to invoke an abandonment analysis to resolve cases of war-
rantless trash reconnaissance. The question of whether one has
abandoned one's trash is no longer germane to the issue of fourth
amendment coverage of that trash.13' Whether an individual
128. Id. at 353 (emphasis added).
129. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 comment c (1979).
130. Coincidentally, traditional property law was itself moving toward contract law
at roughly the same time Katz was decided. Traditional property law concepts were being
replaced by contract law concepts primarily because the latter were more amenable to the
rapid urbanization of America. Property law concepts were considered too archaic to re-
flect the concerns and intentions of modern city dwellers. See Glendon, The Transforma-
tion of American Landlord-Tenant Law, 23 B.C.L. REv. 503 (1982) (lease law had long
been an amalgam of property and contract notions; changes since the nineteenth century
reflect trends in private law generally). Perhaps the most celebrated case regarding the
emerging contract theory of property law was Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d
1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970):
[A]s the Supreme Court has noted in another context, "the body of private prop-
erty law , more than almost any other branch of law, has been shaped by
distinctions whose validity is largely historical." Courts have a duty to reap-
praise old doctrines in the light of the facts and values of contemporary life
As we have said before, "[T]he continued vitality of the common law
depends upon its ability to reflect contemporary community values and ethics."
Id. at 1074 (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 266 (1960), and Whetzel v. Jess
Fisher Management Co., 282 F.2d 943, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1960)) (footnotes omitted).
Because fundamental tenets of property law were being questioned at the time Katz
was decided, the Court may have concluded that those same archaic property law concepts
were wholly inadequate to deal with the myriad fourth amendment issues created by both
the technology explosion and the rapid urbanization of America. See supra note 30
(describing the impact of technological development).
131. "A justified expectation of privacy may exist as to items which have been aban-
doned in the property law sense, just as it is true that no such expectation may exist on
some occasions even though the property has not been abandoned." W LAFAvE, supra
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places garbage at the curbside for pickup or buries it in a ditch,
the intention regarding abandonment is identical. 132 However, in
the second situation it is clear that the person did not dispose of
the trash whimsically Rather, one disposes of trash in this way to
protect the privacy of its contents. Once the focus shifts to the
fact that the trash was disposed of in a private place, the superfi-
cial locational analysis gives way to an analysis of the individual's
fundamental activities. This analysis focuses on "how," as opposed
to "where," a person acts. 33
Such a test assesses the defendant's subjective expectation re-
garding the trash. However, the subjective expectation must be
gauged against the person's objective manifestations of intent.
Hence, any discussion of objective reasonableness need not be ab-
stract. Rather, the conclusion that the defendant's expectation of
privacy is reasonable should mean that the behavioral manifesta-
tions of intent tend to demonstrate the expectation that the de-
fendant claims to have held. This is the proper interpretation of
the phrase "reasonable expectation of privacy" in light of the
Katz majority opinion. Subsequently, notions of abstract objectiv-
ity have entered into the Katz test, confusing the results intended.
Hence, courts have interpreted the reasonable-expectation-of-pri-
vacy test as measuring whether an asserted expectation of privacy
is objectively reasonable in light of social mores. From that point,
the war of values has raged. Regrettably, the justification for this
conflict undermines the very foundation of individual liberty As
one commentator has observed, "'[tihe overriding constitutional
issue of our time has been the split between those who view the
Bill of Rights as a firm judicial mandate empowering the Supreme
note 34, § 2.6(c), at 377.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 83-89.
133. In other contexts, courts have successfully engaged in more fact-specific inquir-
ies to determine the limits of the fourth amendment. The failure to employ a similar ap-
proach in the trash context remains baffling. The urine testing cases are representative of
the correct approach. For instance, in Shaill v. Tippecanoe County School Corp., 864 F.2d
1309 (7th Cir. 1988), the court stated:
The fact that urine is voluntarily discharged from the body and treated as a
waste product does not eliminate the expectation of privacy which an individual
possesses in his or her urine. While urine is excreted from the body, it is not
"knowingly expose[d] to the public instead, the highly private manner by
which an individual disposes of his or her urine demonstrates that it is not in-
tended to be inspected or examined by anyone.
Id. at 1312 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). Likewise, the focus
in cfi]Greenwood should have been the manner in which the garbage was disposed even
though the garbage was voluntarily placed in public.
1991]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Court' to enforce its specific prohibitions, and those who merely
balance its values against competing ones."'1 4 Some even consider
the Bill of Rights "a serious impediment in the war against
crime." ' 5 The result of such thinking has been a radical diminu-
tion of individuals' privacy, based solely on the triumphant value
judgments in the Court's present battle of ideologies.
V APPLYING A BEHAVIORAL MANIFESTATIONS TEST. MAKING
A COGNIZABLE "DEMAND" FOR PRIVACY
The Katz majority intended a formulation of the reasonable-
expectation-of-privacy test that looks to an interpretation of the
defendant's behavioral manifestations. The petitioner in Katz
framed the issues as follows:
When the now discredited physical trespass theory is abandoned
in favor of one stressing the right to privacy, it is possible to
suggest a workable test to be employed in determining whether
or not a specific area is protected by the Fourth Amendment.
This test merely turns on the answer to the question:
"Would the average reasonable man believe that the person
whose conversation had been intercepted intended and desired
his conversation to be private 9 ' 136
An appropriate analysis of a warrantless trash reconnaissance
would consist of simply examining the totality of facts and cir-
cumstances with a view towards determining whether the individ-
ual expected privacy as judged against a reasonable person's inter-
pretation of his or her actual behavior. When the individual's
assertion of an expectation of privacy is judged in light of that
individual's actual behavior, it is not the same as asking simply
whether the individual had a subjective expectation of privacy On
the contrary, this inquiry examines whether the individual is mak-
ing a cognizable "demand" for privacy 137 In Katz the defendant
made such a demand. He placed his call from a public phone
booth, but in a manner that conveyed a demand for privacy
Katz's actions put the community on notice that he did not wish
134. Levine, "The Great Hand of Executive Justice" The Crime Problem and the
Activist Judge, 7 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 907, 938 n.196 (1979-80) (quoting Redlich, Are
There "Certain Rights Retained by the People"?, 37 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 787 (1962)).
135. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 157 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
136. Petitioner's Brief at 13, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (citation
omitted).
137. See Amsterdam, supra note 33, at 384.
[Vol. 41:581
RECYCLING ABANDONMENT
to be intruded upon while he placed his call.
Similarly, looking at the totality of facts and circumstances
in Greenwood, one can reach a conclusion opposite to that of the
Greenwood Court. The threshold inquiry would look to where the
individual performs the acts or places the objects. The public-pri-
vate distinction is still useful insofar as it indicates the types of
further activity necessary to conclude that an expectation of pri-
vacy has been manifested. Since Greenwood placed his trash at
the curbside, the inquiry must look further for evidence that the
defendant put the garbage in this public place in a manner that
put the community on notice of a demand for privacy with respect
to that garbage. In Greenwood that demand is clear. By placing
his trash in opaque bags, sealed at the top, and inside trash con-
tainers, Greenwood sufficiently established a "claim of right" to
privacy in the content of those bags."3 8
Since the Katz Court held that what a person knowingly ex-
poses to the public cannot be protected by the fourth amend-
ment,139 some degree of mens rea is required on the part of the
defendant. How, then, can an individual who takes every precau-
tion to protect objects from exposure still "knowingly" expose
those things to the public 91 40 By plain interpretation, one who
knowingly exposes something to the public indicates an element of
indifference to its discovery Such indifference to discovery cannot
be found where a person takes every reasonable precaution against
disclosure.' 4"
138. "The key to the [fourth] amendment is the question of what interests it pro-
tects. Mr. Katz's conversation in a pay telephone booth was protected because he 'justifia-
bly relied' upon its being protected - relied, not in the sense of an expectation, but in the
sense of a claim of right." Id. at 385 (footnote omitted).
139. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
140. In People v. Agee, 200 Cal. Rptr. 827 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (pursuant to a
court order, this opinion is not published in the official reporter), a California Appellate
Court dealt with the issue of random aerial surveillance of residential backyards for evi-
dence of marijuana cultivation. In rejecting the validity of these warrantless observations,
the court reasoned that "[k]nowing exposure is not the same as any exposure, however
remote the likelihood that members of the general public will avail themselves of it." Id. at
835. The Court in Greenwood seems to have taken the opposite stance, having equated the
bare "likelihood of exposure" with "knowing exposure." See Greenwood v. California, 486
U.S. 35, 40-41 (1988).
141. In his dissenting opinion in Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984), Jus-
tice Marshall described the issue in terms of presumptions and rebuttals of presumptions:
[W]e have traditionally looked to a variety of factors in determining whether an
expectation of privacy asserted in a physical space is "reasonable." First,
we consider whether the expectation at issue is rooted in entitlements defined by
positive law. Second, we consider the nature of the uses to which spaces of the
6091991]
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The approach advocated in this note is a novel one. However,
the importance of its essential element - the defendant's behav-
ioral manifestations - has been underscored in a widely cited dis-
sent by Judge Rabinowitz of the Alaska Supreme Court in Smith
v State.14 2 While Judge Rabinowitz did not adopt the exact'ap-
proach advocated in this note, he expressed a similar preference
for a fact-oriented analysis.
[W]e are concerned with the determination of constitutional
rights rather than spatial relationships or property inter-
ests. It seems to me to be preferable to consider the exter-
nal, behaviorial [sic] manifestations of an individual in order to
ascertain his or her expectations of privacy. 143
Judge Rabinowitz was correct to take an approach to Katz that
looks to the individual's behavioral manifestations. However, he
stopped just short of the more complete exposition advocated here.
He would retain the two-prong test, only modified insofar as the
first prong is concerned. 44 Yet his concern is well taken. Under
sort in question can be put. Third, we consider whether the person claiming a
privacy interest manifested that interest to the public in a way that most people
would understand and respect.
[Some] spaces are, by positive law and social convention, presumed
accessible to members of the public unless the owner manifests his intention to
exclude them.
Id. at 189, 193 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
142. 510 P.2d 793 (Alaska), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1086 (1973).
143. Id. at 801 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting). The case involved a search of a trash
dumpster used at a multi-unit dwelling. Judge Rabinowitz argued for the suppression of
evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant issued upon evidence gained from the search
of the trash dumpster:
Rather than focusing upon the physical location of the dumpster and property
law notions of abandonment of ownership interests, I would focus upon appel-
lant's behavior in an effort to determine whether or not she intended to know-
ingly disclose to the public, publicly communicate, or publicize the contents of
her garbage.
Id. at 803 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
The Ninth Circuit had the opportunity to comment on the then-new Katz test: "[lit
seems to us a more appropriate test is whether it constitutes an intrusion upon what
the resident seeks to preserve as private even in an area which, although adjacent to his
home, is accessible to the public." Wattenburg v. United States, 388 F.2d 853, 857 (9th
Cir. 1968) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)).
144. Judge Rabinowitz clearly intended his behavioral manifestations concept to ap-
ply only to the first, subjective prong of the Harlan test:
[T]he [Alaska Supreme C]ourt adopt[s] an unworkable test which imposes
upon appellant an impossible burden. That is, the court employs the test laid
down by Justice Harlan in Katz In my opinion, establishing a per-
son's subjective expectations or mental attitudes will be extremely difficult, if not
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the present Court's analysis it is impossible for a defendant to
make a case for fourth amendment coverage. The approach taken
by Judge Rabinowitz is more solicitous of the defendant's asserted
expectation of privacy since it examines additional facts which,
from an objective standpoint, may prove the veracity of his claim.
Under Judge Rabinowitz's approach, however, a defendant would
still face the equally difficult burden of countering the generaliza-
tion that fourth amendment protection does not extend to infor-
mation voluntarily conveyed to third persons.
Judge Rabinowitz's approach would not move the Court
away from its veiled abandonment analysis. To do this requires an
additional inquiry into whether the reasonable person would con-
clude that the defendant has made a cognizable demand for pri-
vacy Only then will the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test be
consistent with the approach to fourth amendment analysis con-
templated by the Katz majority Failing this, the reasonable-ex-
pectation-of- privacy test, as it is presently applied by the Court,
is simply a modern name for an archaic approach to fourth
amendment law
CONCLUSION
This note has attempted to demonstrate that there is a per-
vasive rift separating the rationales of Katz and Greenwood, even
though the two are factually similar and purport to apply the
same analysis. Even though Katz was the first case to use what
came to be known as the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test
and Greenwood purports to use that same test, the two analyses
are radically different. The relevant distinction is that Green-
wood's reasonable - expectation - of - privacy analysis actually
amounts to a veiled abandonment approach identical to the analy-
sis employed in pre-Katz cases. The Greenwood Court uses the
wrong analysis because it asks the wrong question. It has inter-
preted the expectation-of-privacy analysis as asking whether a
person's claim to an expectation of priiacy is objectively reasona-
ble. This formulation collapses into an abandonment analysis be-
cause the Court must gauge objective rationality against tradi-
tional property law concepts. For example, the Court presently
impossible, in most cases. It seems to me to be preferable to consider the exter-
nal, behavioral manifestations of an individual in order to ascertain his or her
expectations of privacy.
Smith, 510 P.2d at 801 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
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asks if it is objectively reasonable to expect privacy in something
voluntarily conveyed to third parties. However, this is tantamount
to asking whether the object has been abandoned, as the pre-Katz
Court would have asked.
The reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test, as contemplated
by the Katz majority (though not using that exact terminology),
was conceptually much different than subsequent cases have inter-
preted it to be. The Katz Court demanded far more emphasis on
the steps taken by a person to secure privacy regardless of loca-
tion, taking into account the constraints of his or her environment.
The correct question, however is whether the reasonable person
would conclude that, regardless of the circumstances of one's pre-
sent environment, one has made a cognizable demand for privacy
That is, the Court should ask whether a person's asserted expecta-
tion of privacy is bona fide in light of a reasonable interpretation
of that person's behavioral manifestations. This is the appropriate
inquiry if the phrase "reasonable expectation of privacy" is to em-
body the Katz decision and the policies, alms, and analysis con-
tained therein. Otherwise, the present Court should discontinue its
references to Katz and. admit that it actually uses the abandon-
ment approach employed prior to Katz.
JON E. LEMOLE
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